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Abstract
We present a Reinforcement Learning (RL) methodology to bypass Google reCAPTCHA v3. We formulate the problem as
a grid world where the agent learns how to move the mouse and click on the reCAPTCHA button to receive a high score.
We study the performance of the agent when we vary the cell size of the grid world and show that the performance drops
when the agent takes big steps toward the goal. Finally, we use a divide and conquer strategy to defeat the reCAPTCHA
system for any grid resolution. Our proposed method achieves a success rate of 97.4% on a 100× 100 grid and 96.7% on
a 1000× 1000 screen resolution.
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1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been experiencing unprecedented success in the recent years thanks to the progress
accomplished in Machine Learning (ML), and more specifically Deep Learning (DL). These advances raise several
questions about AI safety and ethics [1]. In this work, we do not provide an answer to these questions but we show
that AI systems based on ML algorithms such as reCAPTCHA v3 [2] are still vulnerable to automated attacks. Google’s
reCAPTCHA system, for detecting bots from humans, is the most used defense mechanism in websites. Its purpose is
to protect against automated agents and bots, attacks and spams. Previous versions of Google’s reCAPTCHA (v1 and
v2) present tasks (images, letters, audio) easily solved by humans but challenging for computers. The reCAPTCHA v1
presented a distorted text that the user had to type correctly to pass the test. This version was defeated by Bursztein
et al. [3] with 98% accuracy using ML-based system to segment and recognize the text. As a result, image-based and
audio-based reCAPTCHAs were introduced as a second version. Researchers have also succeeded in hacking these
versions using ML and more specifically DL. For example, the authors in [4] designed an AI-based system called
UnCAPTCHA to break Google’s most challenging audio reCAPTCHAs. On 29 October 2018, the official third version
was published [5] and removed any user interface. Google’s reCAPTCHA v3 uses ML to return a risk assessment score
between 0.0 and 1.0. This score characterize the trustability of the user. A score close to 1.0 means that the user is human.
In this work, we introduce an RL formulation to solve this reCAPTCHA version. Our approach is programmatic: first,
we propose a plausible formalization of the problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) solvable by state-of-the-art
RL algorithms; then, we introduce a new environment for interacting with the reCAPTCHA system; finally, we analyze
how the RL agent learns or fails to defeat Google reCAPTCHA. Experiment results show that the RL agent passes the
reCAPTCHA test with 97.4 accuracy. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to defeat the reCAPTCHA v3 using RL .
2 Method
2.1 Preliminaries
An agent interacting with an environment is modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [6]. A MDP is defined as
a tuple (S,A, P, r) where S and A are the sets of possible states and actions respectively. P (s, a, s′) is the transition
probabilities between states and r is the reward function. Our objective is to find an optimal policy pi∗ that maximizes
the future expected rewards. Policy-based methods directly learn pi∗. Let’s assume that the policy is parameterized by a
set of weights w such as pi = pi(s, w). Then, the objective is defined as: J(w) = Epi
[∑T
t=0 γ
trt
]
where γ is the discount
factor and rt is the reward at time t.
Thanks to the policy gradient theorem and the gradient trick [7], the Reinforce algorithm [8] estimates gradients using
(1).
∇Epi
[ T∑
t=0
γtrt
]
= Epi
[ T∑
t=0
∇ log pi(at|st)Rt
]
(1)
Rt is the future discounted return at time t defined as Rt =
∑T
k=t γ
(k−t) · rk, where T marks the end of an episode.
Usually the equation (1) is formulated as the gradient of a loss function L(w) defined as follows: L(w) =
− 1N
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=0∇ log pi(ait|sit)Rit where N is the a number of collected episodes.
2.2 Settings
To pass the reCAPTCHA test, a human user will move his mouse starting from an initial position, perform a sequence
of steps until reaching the reCAPTCHA check-box and clicking on it. Depending on this interaction, the reCAPTCHA
system will reward the user with a score. In this work, we modeled this process as a MDP where the state space S is the
possible mouse positions on the web page and the action space is A = {up, left, right, down}. Using these settings, the
task becomes similar to a grid world problem.
As shown in Figure 1, the starting point is the initial mouse position and the goal is the position of the reCAPTCHA is
the web page. For each episode, the starting point is randomly chosen from a top right or a top left region representing
2.5% of the browser window’s area (5% on the x-Axis and 5% on the y-Axis). A grid is then constructed where each pixel
between the initial and final points is a possible position for the mouse. We assume that a normal user will not necessary
move the mouse pixel by pixel. Therefore, we defined a cell size cwhich is the number of pixels between two consecutive
positions. For example, if the agent is at the position (x0, y0) and takes the action left, the next position is then (x0− c, y).
1
Figure 1: The agent’s mouse movement in a MDP
One of our technical contributions consists in our ability to simulate the same user experience as any normal reCAPTCHA
user. This was challenging since reCAPTCHA system uses different methods to distinguish fake or headless browsers,
inorganic behaviors of the mouse, etc. Our environment overcomes all these problems. For more details about the
environment implementation, refer to section 6. At each episode, a browser page will open up with the user mouse at a
random position, the agent will take a sequence of actions until reaching the reCAPTCHA or the horizon limit T defined
as twice the grid diagonal i.e. T = 2 × √a2 + b2 where a and b are the grid’s height and width respectively. Once the
episode ends, the user will receive the feedback of the reCAPTCHA algorithm as would any normal user.
3 Experiments and Results
We trained a Reinforce agent on a grid world of a specific size. Our approach simply applies the trained policy to
choose optimal actions in the reCAPTCHA environment. Our results presented are the success rates across 1000 runs.
We consider that the agent successfully defeated the reCAPTCHA if it obtained a score of 0.9. In our experiments, the
discount factor was γ = 0.99. The policy network was a vanilla two fully connected layer network. The parameters were
learned with a learning rate of 10−3 and a batch size of 2000. Figure 3 shows the results for a 100× 100 grid. Our method
successfully passed the reCAPTCHA test with a success rate of 97.4%.
Next, we consider testing our method on bigger grid sizes. If we increase the size of the grid, the state space dimension
|S| increases exponentially and it is not feasible to train a Reinforce algorithm with a very high dimensional state space.
For example, if we set the grid size to 1000 × 1000 pixels, the state space becomes 106 versus 104 for a 100 × 100. This is
another challenge that we address in this paper: how to attack the reCAPTCHA system for different resolutions without
training an agent for each resolution?
4 An efficient solution to any grid size
In this section, we propose a divide and conquer technique to defeat the reCAPTCHA system for any grid size without
retraining the RL agent. The idea consists in dividing the grid into sub-grids of size 100 × 100 and then applying our
trained agent on these sub-grids to find the optimal strategy for the bigger screen (see Figure 2). Figure 3 shows that this
approach is effective and the success rates for the different tested sizes exceed 90%.
Figure 2: Illustration of the divide and conquer approach: the agent runs sequentially on the diagonal grid worlds in
purple. The grid worlds in red are not explored.
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Figure 3: Reward distribution of the RL agent on different grid resolutions over 1000 episodes
5 Effect of cell size
Here, we study the sensitivity of our approach to the cell size as illustrated in Figure 4.
(a) cell size 1x1 pixel (b) cell size 3x3 pixel
Figure 4: Illustration of the effect of the cell size on the state space
Figure 5 illustrates the obtained performance. We observe that when the cell size increases, the success rate of the agent
decreases. For, cell size of 10, the RL agent is detected as a bot in more than 20% of the test runs. We believe that this
decline is explained by the fact, with a big cell size, the agent scheme will contain more jumps which may be considered
as non-human behavior by the reCAPTCHA system.
6 Details of the reCAPTCHA environment
Most previous works (e.g [4]) used the browser automation software Selenium [9] to simulate interactions with the re-
CAPTCHA system. At the beginning, we adopted the same approach but we observed that the reCAPTCHA system
always returned low scores suggesting that the browser was detected as fake. After investigating the headers of the
HTTP queries, we found an automated header in the webdriver and some additional variables that are not defined in
a normal browser, indicating that the browser is controlled by a script. This was confirmed when we observed that the
reCAPTCHA system with Selenium and a human user always returns a low score.
It is possible to solve this problem in two different ways. The first consists in creating a proxy to remove the automated
header while the second alternative is to launch a browser from the command line and control the mouse using dedicated
Python packages such as the PyAutoGUI library [10]. We adopted the second option since we cannot control the mouse
using Selenium. Hence, unlike previous approches, our environment does not use browser automation tools.
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Figure 5: Reward distribution for different cell sizes over 1000 episodes
Another attempt to use Tor [11] to change the IP address did not pass the reCAPTCHA test and resulted in low scores
(i.e 0.3). It is possible that the reCAPTCHA system uses an API services such as ExoneraTor [12] to determine if the IP
address is part of the Tor network or not on a specific date.
We also discovered that simulations running on a browser with a connected Google account receive higher scores com-
pared when no Google account is associated to the browser.
To summarize, in order to simulate a human-like experience, our reCAPTCHA environment (1) does not use browser
automation tools (2) is not connected using a proxy or VPN (3) is not logged in with a Google account.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a RL formulation to successfully defeat the most recent version of Google’s reCAPTCHA. The main
idea consists in modeling the reCAPTCHA test as finding an optimal path in a grid. We show how our approach achieves
more than 90% success rate on various resolutions using a divide and conquer strategy. This paper should be considered
as the first attempt to pass the reCAPTCHA test using RL techniques. Next, we will deploy our approach on multiple
pages and verify if the reCAPTCHA adaptive risk analysis engine can detect the pattern of attacks more accurately by
looking at the activities across different pages on the website.
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